Showing posts with label nclt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nclt. Show all posts

Monday, 20 May 2024

Mr. Narayanam Nageswara Rao Vs. Mr. K. Sivalingam (RP) and Anr. - Thus, from the explanation as above, we find that the same speaks about connected person to the resolution applicant and not to the corporate debtor. The Resolution applicant herein, being an ex-director of the corporate debtor, we are of the view that contention of the respondent that the applicant is disqualified to submit resolution plan as CD is debarred by SEBI and that the applicant is a connected party to the CD is not maintainable.

NCLT Hyderabad (2024.05.08) in Mr. Narayanam Nageswara Rao Vs. Mr. K. Sivalingam (RP) and Anr. [(2024) ibclaw.in 525 NCLT, IA. Nos. 897 & 898 of 2024 in CP (IB) No. 299/7/HDB/2018] Held that;.

  • Section 29A(j) which says that; “a person shall not be eligible to submit a Resolution Plan if such person has a connected person not eligible under Clauses (a) to (i)”.

  • Thus, from the explanation as above, we find that the same speaks about connected person to the resolution applicant and not to the corporate debtor. The Resolution applicant herein, being an ex-director of the corporate debtor, we are of the view that contention of the respondent that the applicant is disqualified to submit resolution plan as CD is debarred by SEBI and that the applicant is a connected party to the CD is not maintainable.


Excerpts of the order;

This application is filed under section 60 (5) of the insolvency and bankruptcy code, 2016 herein after referred to as “Code” and Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, by the suspended director herein after referred to as the “Applicant” of M/s NCS Sugars Ltd herein after referred to as the “Corporate Debtor”, against the Resolution Professional and Committee of Creditors herein after referred to as the “Respondents no. 1 & 2” respectively,

  • To Set aside the decision taken by the Respondent No.2 in the 18th Committee of Creditors meeting dated 07.03.2024 to the extent of Agenda No.8;

  • To Declare that the Applicant is eligible to submit a Resolution Plan and consequently, permit the Applicant to participate as a Resolution Applicant.

  • IA.No.898 of 2024;

  • To Stay all further proceedings in furtherance of Form-G dated 24.02.2024 issued by the Respondent No.1 or alternatively

  • To Direct the Respondent No. 1 to provide the evaluation matrix and Information Memorandum to the Applicant and permit the Applicant to participate as a Resolution Applicant;


# 1) Brief of averment in the Application:

1.1. That vide order dated 24.06.2022 the Corporate Debtor was admitted into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process herein after referred to as “CIRP”. Subsequently, the Resolution Professional published Form-G on 06.10.2022, inviting bids for the submission of Resolution Plans. The Applicant being a suspended director/promoter, submitted a Resolution Plan in October 2022. However, the Applicant was initially excluded from the provisional list of eligible Resolution Applicants on 30.10.2022, due to missing documents. A revised list on 03.11.2022, included the Applicant, contingent upon providing the required documentation.

1.2. It is averred that due to various factors, the Resolution Professional issued a notice on 24.02.2024, inviting fresh bids. The Applicant was under the impression that previous Expressions of Interest would remain valid unless they opted to submit new one. Despite having submitted an Expression of Interest earlier, the Applicant intended to submit a fresh one. However, the Respondents disqualified the Applicant from participating in the CIRP in the 18th Committee of Creditors meeting on 07.03.2024, citing Section 29A(b) &(f) of the Code based on the following allegation;

  • a. That the Applicant and a related party of the Applicant have been declared as willful defaulters.

  • b. That a connected party of the Applicant herein has been prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Board of India from trading in securities and accessing securities markets.

1.3. It is averred that first allegation of having been declared as ‘willful defaulter’, is currently being challenged in the High Court of Telangana, and an order suspending the willful defaulter tag has been temporarily suspended since 27.04.2023, thus, making the disqualification of the applicant invalid. The second allegation pertains to the connected party of the Applicant, which allegedly barred from the securities market, which was denied by the applicant in an exchange of emails between the applicant and 1st respondent.

1.4. It is averred that the allegation regarding the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) prohibiting the Applicant or its alleged connected party (Corporate Debtor) lacks supporting documentation. The objection was raised based on documents supposedly obtained from the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE India). The Applicant asserts he has no knowledge of any such order against the Corporate Debtor or himself. Stating the above reliance was placed on Section 11(4)(b) of the SEBI Act, 1992, which mandates that any order restraining individuals from accessing the securities market or prohibiting them from dealing in securities must be accompanied by written reasons.

1.5. It is averred that during the 18th CoC meeting, Resolution Professional raised concerns about the uncertainty surrounding SEBI's debarment. However, this information was disregarded, and a decision was made to exclude the applicant from the resolution process due to supposed SEBI debarment and pending litigations. It is further claimed that the CoC attributed disqualification criteria arbitrarily, exceeding the scope outlined in Section 29A of the Code.

1.6. It is averred that on 10.01.2023, the Resolution Professional sent an email to the Applicant containing a link to the SEBI debarred list and an attached Excel sheet from BSE India’ s website. The Applicant was surprised by the data in the Excel sheet. It mentioned that the Unique Client Code (UCC) of the Corporate Debtor was disabled but did not affect the Applicant's trading access. The sheet also showed other entities being restrained from accessing the securities market, but no such order was found against the Applicant. The disablement of UCC only prevents the Corporate Debtor from trading, not the Applicant. This disablement was based on SEBI's recommendation to stock exchanges, not a direct order against the Applicant. The Applicant informed the Resolution Professional about this via email on 02.02.2023.

1.7. It is averred that the Applicant requested the Information Memorandum in the 20th Committee of Creditors meeting and via email but was denied by the Resolution Professional, citing that it contained details discussed in CoC meetings. However, it was represented that the Applicant, as a potential resolution applicant, has the right to access this information. Due to the lack of access to the Information Memorandum, the Applicant couldn't submit its Expression of Interest within the specified timeline and was consequently excluded from the list of prospective resolution applicants. This denial goes against the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code's mandate. Hence, the Applicant has filed this application, feeling aggrieved by the situation.


# 2) In reply to the Application, the 1st Respondent Resolution Professional averred in brief as below:

2.1. That the Resolution Professional denied all allegations made by the Applicant, stating the same as false and devoid of merit. It is averred that the Applicant, being a promoter and member of the suspended board of the Corporate Debtor, is subject to certain disqualifications under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Although exemptions exist for MSME Corporate Debtors, they only pertain to certain clauses of Section 29A, not all.

2.2. It is averred that subsequent to the issuance of Form G dated 05.10.2022 and invitation for Expression of Interest (EOI). The Applicant submitted his EOI in response to the first invitation. However, after reviewing EOIs and conducting due diligence, critical issues regarding the Applicant and connected parties arose: such as firstly, the Applicant and connected parties were categorized as willful defaulters by banks, with outstanding amounts totaling crores of rupees. Secondly, the Corporate Debtor, connected to the Applicant, is barred from accessing the securities market and appears on SEBI's debarred entities list on various stock exchange websites such as NSE/BSE/MCXSX. The said observations were brought to the notice of the Applicant vide email dated 28.12.2022.

2.3. It is averred that the Applicant contends he was unaware of his categorization as a willful defaulter. But parallelly, obtained interim suspension of this categorization from the High Court of Telangana. However, it's important to note that it is temporary, and the final verdict from the High Court is still pending.

2.4. That the Resolution Professional disputed the Applicant's claims regarding their disqualification under Section 29A(f) of the Code. They argue that the absence of a specific order from SEBI restraining the Applicant from accessing the securities market doesn't negate their disqualification. The Resolution Professional contends that Section 29A(f) indeed requires such a prohibition order from SEBI, as outlined in Section 11(4)(b) of the SEBI Act, 1992. They assert that the notices of disablement issued by stock exchanges were based on a circular from NSEL, which clearly marked certain entities, including NCS Sugars Limited, as defaulters, resulting in the immediate disabling of their Unique Client Codes in consultation with SEBI and other exchanges. 

2.5. That the Resolution Professional challenges the Applicant's assertions regarding the disablement of the Unique Client Code (UCC) of the Corporate Debtor. It is averred that despite the Applicant's status as an MSME promoter, they are still subject to disqualifications under Section 29A(b) and 29A(f) read with Section 29A(j) of the Code. The decision to exclude the Applicant as an eligible resolution applicant was made by the CoC based on commercial considerations and the Applicant's antecedents, as recorded in the minutes of the 18th CoC meeting.

2.6. While stating the above-mentioned facts it is averred that there are currently 16 eligible potential resolution applicants (PRAs) for the Corporate Debtor. The original deadline for submitting the resolution plan was May 9, 2024. However, following directions from the Hon'ble Bench on May 1, 2024, the Resolution Professional sought instructions from the Committee of Creditors (CoC). The majority of the CoC, via email dated May 2, 2024, conveyed that since the extension of the deadline for plan submission is scheduled to be discussed in the upcoming CoC meeting on May 3, 2024, and no resolution plan has been received thus far, the last date for plan submission may be extended by one month. During this extended period, no agenda for voting on resolution plans will be placed before the CoC.


# 3) In the light of the facts as above mentioned the point that arises for our consideration is:

Whether the decision of the Committee of Creditors dated 07.03.2024 disqualifying of the Applicant warrants the interference of Tribunal? If so, for what relief?


# 4) We heard the Ld. Counsel Ms.Siva Praneetha and Learned Senior Counsel Mr. P Vikaram appearing for the applicant, and Learned Counsel for Resolution Professional/ 1st Respondent Y. Suryanarayana and perused the record.


Point.

Whether the decision of the Committee of Creditors dated 07.03.2024 disqualifying of the Applicant warrants the interference of Tribunal? If so, for what relief?


# 5) Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant being a suspended director of corporate debtor which is an MSME unit, intends to participate in the CIRP of the corporate debtor by submitting a resolution plan but respondents are not qualifying him as potential resolution applicant on the unsustainable grounds. The applicant further submits that the Respondents disqualified the Applicant from participating in the CIRP in the 18th Committee of Creditors meeting on 07.03.2024, citing Section 29A(b) &(f) of the Code based on the following allegation;

  • A. That the Applicant and a related party of the Applicant have been declared as willful defaulters.

  • B. That a connected party of the Applicant herein has been prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Board of India from trading in securities and accessing securities markets.


# 6) Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that he has challenged the decision to declare him as willful defaulter in Hon’ble High Court of Telangana, and obtained interim suspension of this categorization from the High Court of Telangana, therefore as on date of submission of plan this disqualification is not applicable to him. Learned counsel further contended that in the e-mail sent by Resolution Professional to the Applicant containing a link to the SEBI debarred list and an attached Excel sheet from BSE India’ s website, only Unique Client Code (UCC) of the Corporate Debtor was disabled and applicant’s name does not find place in the said list. Since applicant’s name is not there in the debarred list of SEBI, it does not affect Applicant's trading access to stock exchanges. In view of the above facts, this disqualification cannot be ascribed to him.


# 7) Learned counsel for the respondents admit that applicant has obtained interim suspension of his categorization as willful defaulter from the High Court of Telangana, however, he further submitted that it is temporary, and the final verdict from the High Court is still pending. Learned counsel further contended that since applicant’s name is not there in the debarred list of SEBI, he may not be covered under Section 29 A(f) but since corporate debtor’s name is there in the debarred list and he being a connected party to the CD, he will be disqualified under Section 29 A(j) being a connected party to the corporate debtor.


# 8) While stating the above-mentioned facts, the respondents also submitted that there are currently 16 eligible potential resolution applicants (PRAs) for the Corporate Debtor. The original deadline for submitting the resolution plan was May 9, 2024. However, following directions from the Hon'ble Bench on May 1, 2024, the Resolution Professional sought instructions from the Committee of Creditors (CoC). The majority of the CoC, via email dated May 2, 2024, conveyed that since the extension of the deadline for plan submission is scheduled to be discussed in the upcoming CoC meeting on May 3, 2024, and no resolution plan has been received so far, the last date for plan submission may be extended by one month. During this extended period, no agenda for voting on resolution plans will be placed before the CoC. 


# 9) We have carefully perused Section 29A(j) which says that; “a person shall not be eligible to submit a Resolution Plan if such person has a connected person not eligible under Clauses (a) to (i)”. Further explanation is given that what is the meaning of “connected person” for the purpose of this section which is reproduced as under:

  • Explanation [I]. — For the purposes of this clause, the expression "connected person" means— (i) any person who is the promoter or in the management or control of the resolution applicant; or (ii) any person who shall be the promoter or in management or control of the business of the corporate debtor during the implementation of the resolution plan; or (iii) the holding company, subsidiary company, associate company or related party of a person referred to in clauses (i) and (ii): 6 [Provided that nothing in clause (iii) of Explanation I shall apply to a resolution applicant where such applicant is a financial entity and is not a related party of the corporate debtor:


Thus, from the explanation as above, we find that the same speaks about connected person to the resolution applicant and not to the corporate debtor. The Resolution applicant herein, being an ex-director of the corporate debtor, we are of the view that contention of the respondent that the applicant is disqualified to submit resolution plan as CD is debarred by SEBI and that the applicant is a connected party to the CD is not maintainable. Further, we should always bear in mind that legislature while passing the Bill, has given some special relaxation under Section 29(A) to MSME promoters so that they are allowed to participate in the resolution process of corporate debtor.


# 10) Therefore, in the above backdrop, we hereby hold that the impugned decision made by the Committee of Creditors in the 18th Meeting held on 07.03.2024 disqualifying the Applicant, needs our interference.   The point is accordingly decided.


# 11) In view of the above, we allow IA 897/ 2024 and set aside the decision taken by the 2nd Respondent in the 18th Committee of Creditors meeting dated 07.03.2024 to the extent of Agenda No.8 and declare that the Applicant is eligible to submit a Resolution Plan and consequently, permit the Applicant to participate as a Resolution Applicant.


# 12) The prayers as sought in IA no 898/2024 are consequential to the prayers sought in IA no 897/2024, hence this application is also allowed.


In terms of our above findings , IA 897/ 2024 and IA 898/ 2024 are allowed and disposed of however without costs.

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Tuesday, 23 January 2024

Navayuga Engineering Company Ltd. Vs. Mr. Umesh Garg, RP of Athena Demwe Power Ltd. - Adjudicating Authority would have been well within its powers to reject a Resolution Plan if the disqualification of SRA under Section 29A of IBC, 2016 is brought to/comes to its notice before its approval.

 NCLT New Delhi-II (26.05.2023) In Navayuga Engineering Company Ltd. Vs. Mr. Umesh Garg, RP of Athena Demwe Power Ltd. [CA. NO. 237/ND/2018 IN Company Petition No. (IB)-244(ND)/2017] held that;

  • Adjudicating Authority would have been well within its powers to reject a Resolution Plan if the disqualification of SRA under Section 29A of IBC, 2016 is brought to/comes to its notice before its approval. 

  • The Section 29A(c) of IBC, 2016 has three essential conditions that viz, 

  • (a) the account of the Corporate Debtor must be NPA, 

  • (b) such account must be under the management or control of such persons (Resolution Applicant) or of whom such person is a Promoter, and 

  • (c) at least a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such classification till the date of commencement of CIR process of the Corporate Debtor. 


Excerpts of the order; 

VI. Discussion and Observations

# 15. We have heard the Ld. Counsels for the Applicant, RP, and CoC in detail and perused the documents placed on records including their Written Submissions and Convenience compilations.


# 16. From the records, it is observed that RP/CoC has considered the Applicant/NECL as ineligible under Section 29A of IBC 2016 and held that the Resolution plan submitted by the Applicant/NECL falls within the purview of Section 29A(c) of IBC,2016 mainly on the following grounds that the: 

  • (i) Applicant/NECL is the Promoter of the ADPL/Corporate Debtor.

  • (ii) Applicant/NECL is a promoter of another Corporate Debtor namely, East Coast Energy Pvt. Ltd, whose account has been declared as NPA.


# 17. The Applicant/NECL submitted that the decision to consider them ineligible under Section 29A of IBC, 2016, and treat them as falling within the purview of Section 29A(c) was communicated by the RP vide e-mail dated 22.06.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “disqualification e-mail”). When we peruse the said e-mail, we find that the disqualification was not done or communicated on the ground of any connection of the Applicant with M/s East Cost Energy Pvt. Ltd. However, during the course of the hearing, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Applicant submitted that this additional ground, to disqualify the Applicant/NECL has been resorted to subsequent to the issuance of the abovementioned disqualification e-mail communication. This act was not disputed by the Ld. Counsels appearing for the RP and CoC. In  our considered view, the ground which was neither considered by CoC in its meeting nor recorded in its minutes nor communicated by RP to the Applicant to disqualify the Applicant, cannot be relied upon at this belated stage. Hence, this Adjudicating Authority will limit its adjudication to the grounds, based on which disqualification of the Applicant/NECL was arrived at and communicated vide e-mail dated 22.06.2018.


# 18. Accordingly, the issue, which emerges for our consideration and Adjudication is “Whether the Applicant / Navayuga Engineering Company Limited (NECL), was a ‘promoter’ of the Corporate Debtor/ Athena Demwe Power Ltd (ADPL).”


# 19. For this purpose, when we refer to the word ‘promoter’, we observe that the same is not defined under IBC, 2016. Therefore, in line with the provisions under Section 3(37) of IBC 2016, we have to rely upon the definition provided under Section 2(69) of the Companies Act, 2013, which reads thus:

  • # 2(69) - promoter; means a person -

  • (a) who has been named as such in a prospectus or is identified by the company in the annual return referred to in section 92; or

  • (b) who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, director or otherwise; or

  • (c) in accordance with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act:

  • Provided that nothing in sub-clause (c) shall apply to a person who is acting merely in a professional capacity;


On perusal of Section 2(69)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013, we observe that the adjective “control” has been used. The definition of “control” is given under Section 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013, which reads thus:

  • #2(27) - control shall include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner;


# 20. Thus, we find that the definition of “control” is quite inclusive and non-exhaustive in nature. Therefore, we would like to examine whether the Applicant/NECL was having control over the affairs of the ADPL/Corporate Debtor in terms of this definition.


# 26. On perusal of the above clauses, it is observed that the “Effective Date” of the MOU was the date on which it was executed by and between the parties i.e., 23.03.2016. This date is also evident from the date of the Stamp Paper, annexed with the said MOU.


# 27. We also observe that there are no timelines stipulated in the MOU with respect to the Receipt of regulatory approvals, Execution of definitive Shareholders’ Agreements, etc. Further, Clause 4.5 of the MOU mentions that “…Till the financial closure of the project is achieved or Definitive Agreements executed, the internal management of the Company would be run on the basis of the provisions of this MOU.” Moreover, even if the MOU was subject to regulatory approvals and approvals by senior lenders, which if not received, the Applicant could have followed the procedure to seek termination of the MOU by following the mandate of clause 8.9, which was not followed. Hence, both in effect and practice, clause 4.5 of the MOU remained operational. 


# 28. Furthermore, we observe that by virtue of Clause 3.2 (reproduced in para 24 above), from the Effective Date i.e., 23.03.2016, the Applicant was vested with the right to nominate the majority of the Directors on the reconstituted Board of ADPL/CD, which depicts that the Applicant/NECL was capable of constituting the composition of the Board. 


# 29. Further, as we have noticed from the email communications between the parties (NECL and ADPL), especially the mail dated 10.01.2017, the Applicant was advising the Corporate Debtor on policy-related issues viz., investment, subscription of shares, EPC Contracts, etc, which indicates that the Applicant/NECL was exercising its ‘control’ over the Corporate Debtor/ADPL through policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly in terms of the term ‘Control’ as defined under Section 2(69)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013.


# 32. In view of the Judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court (Supra), it can be inferred that the amendment in Section 29(A)(c) i.e., “at the time of submission of the resolution plan” was clarificatory in nature. Hence, the trigger point of Section 29A is the date when the Resolution Plan was actually submitted by the Resolution Applicant to the CoC. In view of the above and therefore, the date of transfer of shares by the Applicant/NECL in Regina (RIPL) during the period when Section 29A of IBC, 2016 was not notified, will/does not create an escape route for the Applicant, since the date on which the Resolution plan was actually submitted by the Applicant/NECL to the CoC i.e., on 04.06.2018, the Section 29A of IBC, 2016 was in force. 


# 37. In view of the examination of the aforesaid chain of events and documents placed on record, we observe that the entire transaction of the transfer of shares of Regina (RIPL) by the Applicant/NECL was done in cash, the date of receipt of which cannot be proved beyond doubt (in the absence of any digital record), especially when both the transferor and transferee of shares are known and connected. Further, as noted earlier, when the Applicant/NECL had given a loan of Rs. 328 Crores to Regina (RIPL), the transfer of its shares by the Applicant/NECL at a nominal amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh) only, that too only 6 days prior to the date of commencement of the CIR Process of the Corporate Debtor/ADPL, raises serious doubts about the fairness of the connected-party transaction. In the circumstances, there exist sufficient grounds for agreeing with the contention of CoC/RP that the transaction was a sham.  


# 38. However, it is still contended by the Applicant/NECL that there is nothing illegal in the transaction and there is no law, which prohibits such a transaction even if it was done in cash. Further, it was argued as to what price, the shares should be sold is the prerogative of the Transferor and Transferee of shares and the RP has no jurisdiction to raise any objections towards it. In view of such a contention raised by the Applicant that the transactions of shares of the Applicant/NECL in Regina (RIPL) were genuine and legal, which for the time being if we assume so, a question arises, whether Regina (RIPL) can still be considered under the “control” of the Applicant/NECL


# 41. At this stage, at the cost of repetition, we again refer to the definition of ‘Control’ as defined under Section 2(69)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013, which reads thus: 

  • #2(27) - control shall include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner;


We observe that the definition of “Control” is an inclusive and non exhaustive one that, inter alia, includes the following - 

  • a) right to appoint a majority of directors, or 

  • b) to control the management, or 

  • c) policy decision exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly 

  • d) including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreement or voting agreements or in any other manner.


# 42. Therefore, in terms of Section 2(69)(b) of the Companies Act 2013, besides shareholding, there are other ways of exercising ‘control’ over a company/entity. As observed earlier, the RP has alleged that Mr. K. Vijayabhaskar, to whom 50% of the shares of Regina (RIPL) were transferred, was an official acting on behalf of the Applicant/NECL and to substantiate this fact, he had referred to Mr. K. Vijayabhaskar’s email id mentioned in the share transfer deed. Accordingly, at this stage, we would like to examine Whether there was any direct or indirect connection between Mr. K. Vijayabhaskar and other Directors of Regina (RIPL) with the Applicant/Navayuga/NECL or its Related/Connected Entities.


# 49. Thus, it is observed that even though the Applicant/Navayuga/NECL sold its 100% shareholding in Regina (RIPL) and even if we assume that the said sale was genuine and legal, we find that the Directors of the Connected/Related Companies to the Navayuga (NECL)/Applicant still continued/are continuing in the Board of Regina (RIPL). Thus, on the lifting of the Corporate Veil, we have no doubt in our mind that the Applicant/Navayuga (NECL) was indeed exercising control over Regina (RIPL) through the Directors of its Related/Connected Companies. 


# 50. Thus, we have examined the transaction of shares in Regina (RIPL) from both angles. Not only, we did not find any reason to differ with the contention of RP/CoC that the transaction was a sham, but also even for the sake of argument, while assuming the transaction to be genuine, we found that the Applicant/NECL was exercising control over Regina (RIPL) through the Directors of its Related/Connected Companies. Hence, we find no merit in the contention raised by the Applicant/NECL that after the sale of its shareholding, it was not in a position to control Regina (RIPL) hence, it cannot be said to be in control of the ADPL/Corporate Debtor


VII. Procedural Impropriety

# 51. It is further submitted by the Applicant/NECL that it is post submission of EOI, the RP vide its following email dated 02.05.2018 communicated that prima facie, the Applicant herein was eligible to submit the Resolution Plan. In the normal course, it was the duty of the RP to verify the eligibility of the Resolution Applicants immediately on/after receipt of EOIs only. It was not apt for the RP to wait till the submission of the Resolution Plan and then, consider and decide the eligibility of the Resolution Applicants under Section 29A of IBC 2016. Even if we assume this as a lapse, the fact that the Applicant/NECL was disqualified under Section 29A would not have changed and the outcome still would have remained the same. Furthermore, in our considered view, even if the fact of disqualification of the Applicant/NECL under Section 29A of IBC 2016 had come to the notice of RP/CoC subsequent to the opening of the Resolution Plan, RP/CoC are duty bound to take cognizance of such a fact prior to approval of Resolution Plan and act as per the provisions of the IBC 2016. Certainly, the procedure(s) cannot take precedence or override the legal infirmity, even if the same is noticed subsequently. Even for that matter, post-approval of a Resolution Plan by the CoC, this Adjudicating Authority would have been well within its powers to reject a Resolution Plan if the disqualification of SRA under Section 29A of IBC, 2016 is brought to/comes to its notice before its approval. 


# 53. Thus, we find that the Corporate Debtor was NPA since 31.05.2013 and continuing so on the date of filing of the Resolution Plan by the Applicant/NECL, which is one of the criteria laid down for disqualification under Section 29A(c) of IBC 2016.


IX. Conclusion 

# 54. As per the Judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2 SCC 1, the amendment in Section 29(A)(c) i.e., “at the time of submission of the resolution plan” was clarificatory in nature. Hence, the trigger point of Section 29A is the date when the Resolution Plan was actually submitted by the Resolution Applicant to the CoC. In the instant case, the Resolution plan was submitted by the Applicant/NECL to the CoC on 04.06.2018, when Section 29A of IBC, 2016 was already in force. 


# 55. In the sequel of the discussion and observations in Part VI of this order, we conclude that the Applicant herein/NECL was a ‘promoter’ exercising its ‘control’ over the Corporate Debtor/ADPL in view of the following findings – 

  • (i) Clause 4.5 of the MOU dated 23.03.2016 i.e.,“…Till the financial closure of the project is achieved or Definitive Agreements executed, the internal management of the Company would be run on the basis of the provisions of this MOU” remained operational both in effect and practice. Further, even if the MOU was subject to regulatory approvals and approvals by senior lenders, which if not received, the Applicant did not get the MOU terminated in terms of clause 8.9. 

  • (ii) By virtue of Clause 3.2 of the said MOU, from the Effective Date i.e., 23.03.2016, the Applicant was vested with the right to nominate the majority of the Directors on the reconstituted Board of ADPL/CD, which depicts that the Applicant/NECL was capable of constituting the composition of the Board. 

  • (iii) The Applicant/NECL was exercising its ‘control’ over the Corporate Debtor/ADPL through the exchange of variouscommunications/policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly in terms of the term ‘Control’ as defined under Section 2(69)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013. 

  • (iv) The entire transaction of the transfer of shares of Regina (RIPL) by the Applicant/NECL was done in cash, the date of receipt of which cannot be proved beyond doubt in the absence of any digital record, especially when both the transferor and transferee of shares are known and connected to each other. Further, while the Applicant/NECL had given a loan of Rs. 328 Crores to Regina (RIPL), the act of transferring its shares including to one of the Directors of Regina at a nominal amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh), that too only 6 days prior to the date of commencement of the CIR Process of the Corporate Debtor/ADPL, raises serious doubts about the fairness of the transaction. In the circumstances, there exists sufficient ground for agreeing with the contention of CoC/RP that the transaction was a sham. 

  • (v) Even otherwise, on lifting the Corporate Veil of Regina (RIPL), we found that the Applicant/Navayuga (NECL) was exercising control over Regina (RIPL) through the “Directors of its Related/Connected Companies” even on the date of submission of the Resolution Plan. 


# 56. We have also noted, in paragraph 53 above, from the documents placed on record that the Corporate Debtor was NPA since 31.05.2013. 


# 57. The Section 29A(c) of IBC, 2016 has three essential conditions that viz, 

  • (a) the account of the Corporate Debtor must be NPA, 

  • (b) such account must be under the management or control of such persons (Resolution Applicant) or of whom such person is a Promoter, and 

  • (c) at least a period of one year has elapsed from the date of such classification till the date of commencement of CIR process of the Corporate Debtor. 


# 58. In the instant case, we have found that all the three ingredients of the Section 29A(c) are met i.e., (a) the account of the Corporate Debtor/ADPL was NPA since 31.05.2013, (b) a period of more than 4 years has lapsed from the date of NPA till the commencement of CIRP of the Corporate Debtor on 28.09.2017, and (c) the Applicant herein/NECL has been found to be a ‘promoter’ exercising its ‘control’ over the Corporate Debtor/ADPL through Regina (RIPL). 


# 59. In view of the above, we find no error committed by the RP/CoC in holding the Applicant/NECL as ineligible in terms of Section 29A(c) of IBC, 2016 to submit the Resolution Plan. Hence, all the prayers made in the present application stand rejected. 60. 


The Application is accordingly, Dismissed.


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Section-29A - Compliances by RP

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India 7th Floor, Mayur Bhawan, Connaught Place, New Delhi – 110001 CIRCULAR Circular No. IBBI/CIRP/88/202...